401. colossus - July 20, 1999 - 5:10 PM PT
"Now that I think of it, didn't Keegan assert that the small US detachments already at the front were decisive in blunting the Ludendorf offensives? Don't have the book with me, but I think so..,"
No, I don't think so and I hate looking for something that isn't there.
On the same subject (sort of). Lazy George recommended (sort of) a book on the history of the Great German General Staff which I have begun to read.
The prolific author of the book is a retired USA Col. His speciality is not organization but statistical analysis of war.
In appendix C he summarizes his analysis of the relative combat strength of the Germans v. their opponents on all fronts, 15 battles.
Overall, adjusted for the defense which Germans were mostly in since 1914, the German units were 5 times as effective as the Allies. The score narrows on the Western Front where the effectiveness score was 1.63 to 1.10 (10 battles).
This trend diminished thru the war yet during the Ludendorf offensives (Somme II & Lys) the effectiveness score was 1.15 to 1.08 and 1.39 to 1.24. The Meuse Argonne offensive where the Germans fought fresh US troops after being battered themselves in Ludendorff was a draw.
The German edge BEFORE their offensives was better than 2 to 1 on the Western Front.
Remember, this is AFTER adjustment for being on the defensive where the edge is 3 to 1 for the defenders.
My point is that the Germans, especially if they were allowed to enjoy the fruits of Brest-Litovsk, would have had no difficulty remaining in a defensive posture in France, indefinitely had the US not intervened.
402. RustlerPike - July 21, 1999 - 10:36 AM PT
colossus Message #379:
No need to get so worked up, man. I didn't say that a lack of racist focus made Stalin less evil. I listed the race theory as part of what makes Hitler and Nazism, to me, the *epitome* of evil. You evidently do not look at things the way I do. My view of things is probably too Hollywoodish for your taste. Maybe your approach is more level-headed and scientific. Maybe not. Sorry.
I still see the Nazis as The Big Evil. It may have something to do with the fact that they took pride in filming their evil works for posterity, and that my upbringing included watching those films, and the ones made by the Allies in the newly liberated death camps. It may have something to do with the fact that there are a lot of neo-Nazi groups out there today, and quite a lot of Hitler worshippers, but I've never heard of neo-Stalinist youth groups (not in the West anyway). It may have something to do with the fact that it was the Nazis who killed my grandparents' families.
Like I said - no need to get all worked up. You think Stalin was worse - that's your right. I choose to focus my feelings of hatred - to the extent that I have such feelings - on Hitler, the Nazis, and - to a certain degree - on the German people. I think that's my right too.
403. cmboyce - July 21, 1999 - 11:01 AM PT
Message #401
Colossus, what is being measured in these scorecards? Simply relative casualties? Some quantitative rendering of the accomplishing of previously-stated missions? And what does "adjusted for the defense..." mean? And lastly, if "2-1" is a proper assessment of German superiority before the offensives, why didn't they whip the allies asses?
I hope I don't sound tendentious. I just don't understand the post.
404. lazygeorge - July 21, 1999 - 3:52 PM PT
To understand Dupuy's tables you need to understand his "Quantified Judgment Model" of combat and his historical data. He explains it and gives some examples in: Understanding War. I do not totally understand it. Dupuy had a think tank called HERO that used QJM extensively.
405. colossus - July 22, 1999 - 4:17 PM PT
Rustler -
I *always* get worked up. Sorry. Like I've said, I'm no fan of the Nazis (except that they are historically fascinating) and D. Goldhagen's book made me ill.
Comparative evil's just not my thing.
406. colossus - July 22, 1999 - 4:27 PM PT
LG's correct and thanks for the further info btw.
CM....
As I understand Dupuy's analysis, the base is casualties inflicted per man engaged (labwabbit's sure to jump on this one) adjusted for which side was on defense and which was on offense.
There's a great deal more to war than that, of course. The Brits, for one instance, lost Singapore to the Japanese with very few casualties. The adjustment for whether one side or the other is on defense takes into account the supposed advantage of being on the defensive when it comes to casualties, ie. it costs 3 times more men to attack than to defend a position. Dupuy's summary table built upon the models LG refers to merely attempt to compare the "killing efficiency" of each side when the factor of offense/defense is taken into account.
My point is that given the considerable superiority of the German soldier (Dupuy would attribute that to leadership and training) AND the natural advantage of defense over offense (seen time and time again esp in WWI trench war) the Germans could have remained indefinitely in a defensive position on French territory UNLESS the US intervened.
407. colossus - July 22, 1999 - 4:29 PM PT
Message #396
Labwabbit -
What makes the grass grow?
Blood - blood - blood
{Full Metal Jacket}
408. labwabbit - July 22, 1999 - 5:16 PM PT
colossus:
Nah...I use a little water and ....well, I see you have some of that too .....
:>
409. RustlerPike - July 22, 1999 - 11:35 PM PT
colossus:
Enlighten me - what was the basic thrust of Goldhagen's book?
410. Amaxen - July 23, 1999 - 10:34 AM PT
I've gotta say, tho, that the relative 'killing effeciency' or power of armies is only rarely the direct factor in which country wins. Rather, it seems to me that the will of the political leaders & the stability of the political system backing them is much more important, historically, than how effective their armies are in the field. Granted, you might be able to argue that WWII is the exception to this, but even then, there are some quite important caveats to the 'total war' policy as practiced by most of the major belligerents. Example: There is quite a bit of debate among professional historians whether the bombing campaign against Germany was effective. One of the key arguments of the anti-Bomber group is that, despite the near-total razing of most German cities&infrastructure, German war production nearly doubled during 1944. One of the reasons for this is that Germany did not go to full war production until then. The reason? Hitler felt that reducing the production of consumer goods would directly threaten his regime.
Marshall warned FDR in 1943 that he felt the war would have to be won in less than 6 years, or else Public opinion would turn against it and move in favor of a negotiated truce.
Nothing that was posted indicates that anyone is saying otherwise, but (irony mode: on) I thought I might clarify for the benefit of the mass-readership of this thread (irony mode:off)
411. ranheim - July 23, 1999 - 4:14 PM PT
The period between the two wars is mostly denigrated by historians. The stock market boomed; then crashed. This was the era of the "flappers"; crazy new dances; bootleg whisky : THE ROARING TWENTIES!. Times were good; but, people were taking off in new tangents; as compared to the various eras prior to the war. The automobile would yield new freedoms to those who could afford. The move toward a more urban america became more visible to all citizens. Women smoked and drank in public; and "their bathing suits!" The young, to include Teddie's daughter Alice, had no morals. Then came the decade of the thirties and the Depression with its long food lines; soup kitchens; high un-employment. An era many would like to forget about.
In one area, however, the USA was absolutely solid : foreign affairs. Recall that Wilson had Col. House form The Inquiry during the war. By the early 20s The Inquiry - with business/banking additions from New York City - had become the Council on Foreign Relations(CFR). (The same organization held in such suspicion be the "far right" today.) Hoover's Secretary of State(Henry Stimson)was a member of the CFR. I don't know if his two predecessors as Secy of State : Charles Evans Hughes and Frank B. Kellogg were members of the CFR as well. But, to use terminology of that day, these three were "solid men". I believe that all the Secy of State since Stimson have been members of the CFR. I don't like the totally international - anti-nationalistic and suspicious of patriotism - bent of the CFR, but, the members are talented and informed men and women.
The whole point of these paragraphs is to highlight that though things may be chaotic within the USA, foreign relations were handled by a group of talented and well informed men (inter-war years). That due to the international business and banking community situated at that time in New York City.
412. colossus - July 23, 1999 - 6:02 PM PT
Message #409
Gee Rustler I'd taken for granted you'd read Hitler's Willing Executioners.
The theme of the book is that Germans were not just passive but complicit in Hitler's crimes.
The book roughly divides into two parts - German anti-semitism through the ages and evidence that "ordinary" Germans were beastial.
It is a stimulating book but controversial. I found it difficult to read in the sense of "revolting".
413. colossus - July 23, 1999 - 6:04 PM PT
"bestial"
414. colossus - July 23, 1999 - 6:14 PM PT
RP -
For more info on the controversy surrounding Daniel Goldhagen see This Article in the Slate Archive
415. colossus - July 23, 1999 - 6:20 PM PT
Goldhagen writes: "[The book] also shows that the eliminationist antisemitism which moved these ordinary Germans was extremely widespread in German society during and even before the Nazi period. The basic eliminationist antisemitic model held that Jews were
different from Germans, that these putative differences resided in their biology, conceptualized as race, and were therefore immutable, that the Jews were evil and powerful, had done great harm to Germany, and would continue to do so. The conclusion drawn by Germans who shared this view was that Jews and putative Jewish power had to be eliminated somehow if Germany was to be secure and prosper.
When Hitler came to power, he was therefore easily able to mobilize many ordinary Germans first in the utterly radical persecutions of the 1930s -- which all Germans knew about and against which little principled dissent existed -- and then, when called upon, even for the extermination of the 1940s. He could do so because, even if most Germans, on their own, had certainly never considered acting upon the radical implications of their views of Jews, all the Nazis' eliminationist anti-Jewish policies had as their foundation this widely shared, pre-existing model of the nature of Jews. The German perpetrators of the Holocaust were motivated to kill Jews principally by their belief that the extermination was necessary and just.
While my book treats other themes, this is its core argument,"
416. RustlerPike - July 24, 1999 - 1:17 AM PT
colossus:
OK, thanks for the link. I've checked it out and even reached http://www.goldhagen.com through it.
I don't see myself reading Goldhagen's book - unless it is a short one. I have no time for tomes. How long is it?
Anyhow - I don't need the book to despise Nazi Germany, and to a certain extent - the Germans. I really don't. I see the cruelty in German children's classics like Struwwelpeter (which is now showing in Israel) and Max und Moritz (the Hebrew version of which was a part of my childhood)*; I have heard, over the years, of various German crap that tends to surface in TV commercials and such like - a spot promoting safety showing a kid having his finger cut off by an electric saw, stuff like that; I have heard that German municipal laws include rules that stipulate crap like "window shutters shall be closed between the hours of 2 and 4 PM", and that these laws are actually enforced; I remember the way a family of Turkish immigrants were burned alive only recently, and the too-efficient way prostitutes with AIDS were rounded up and quarantined.
One forms a general impression of a nation's character, or lack of, over the years. A nation that, at the peak of its physical strength, saw as national priority #1 the extermination of an unarmed people has got something wrong with it. If the Jews were at all like the Germans, WW3 would have started sometime in the 70's, during or after the Yom Kippur War.
*I imagine you'll say that the fact that these German classics have been translated into Hebrew undermines my case. I don't think it does.
417. Amaxen - July 24, 1999 - 4:29 PM PT
"If the Jews were at all like the Germans, WW3 would have started sometime in the 70's, during or after the Yom Kippur War."
I'm no expert on Israeli history, but didn't the US rein in the Israelis by threatening to withold any more logistical support if Israel continued to drive into the Arab territory, because of exactly that fear of the Israelis sparking WWIII? As I vaguely recall from my Dip history classes, the Israelis wanted to continue to drive to the last breath of man and horse, but they simply did not have the logistical capacity to do so without American air-lifted logistical supply. Of course, this was out of an American history book taught in an American school by Americans. Is the Israeli official interpretation different from this?
Also, does anyone on the thread remember who said that WWII was a defeat for German arms but a triumph for German philosophy? Parts of Pike's post reminded me of that quote, but I'm not sure what the context (of the quote) was.
Re: Goldhagen: I have seen the book & its reviews, but I had assumed that he was making the kind of point his critics say he was: The logic being: Here I show anti-semitism in Germany prior to WWII, therefore Hitler was inevitable. Does he do anything in the book to establish that Germans were _more_ anti-semitic&racist than other nations?
If so, it might be worth reading, but if not, well, it doesn't seem to be worth the time.
418. RustlerPike - July 24, 1999 - 7:47 PM PT
Amaxen:
The story about the US reining Israel in sounds familiar. I have no idea how true it is. But what I meant was something different: if Israel was as hysterical in its reactions to perceived threats as Germany has been in this century, all those nuclear-tipped missiles we have - or at least a couple of them - would have been launched when Israel seemed to be under threat of extinction, as was the case in the first few days of the Yom Kippur War. Dayan and Golda were shocked, dazed and depressed - but did not go nuts. Had they decided to go nuclear, Nixon couldn't have done anything to stop them.
419. Amaxen - July 24, 1999 - 7:59 PM PT
Rustler,
Funny, I have always regarded Israel's acquistion of Nukes with some deep strategic misgivings: Israel is a small, (what is it, 80 miles across?) urban nation with almost all of its population in a few cities, with its surrounding enemies being very large, rural, and with well spread out populations. Seems to me that Israel would lose decisively if it initiated a nuclear exchange: retaliation would just about crater the entire country w/half a dozen warheads/suitcase bombs, while it would take several thousand to achieve anything like the same effect on the Arabs. Acquision of nukes probably is a spur to Israel's enemies to also acquire some. Just does not seem to make strategic sense, to me, at any rate.
420. lazygeorge - July 26, 1999 - 5:53 AM PT
John Keegan will be on CSPAN discussing WWI on Saturday evening.
421. Wombat - July 26, 1999 - 6:40 AM PT
Israeli nuclear doctrine is this:
If the Arabs ever get their act together enough to launch a multi-front, air-land coordinated attack on Israel, Israel becomes indefensible in a hurry. Should this circumstance occur, the Arab states would know that their capitals and other major cities would be nuked if Israel is facing military defeat and national annihilation. Israel also reserves the right to use its nukes to retaliate if its cities were subject to poison gas attack.
This is pretty standard nuclear deterrence doctrine: Israel has the capability to inflict what would hopefully be unacceptable damage to its enemy's home countries, making the price of an all-out attempt to destroy Israel too high to pay.
Deterrence theory does assume a "rational actor" model in setting up a deterrence structure. with the possible exception of India and Pakistan, the Middle East probably has less rational actors than any other region in the world. Fortunately, state driven Islamic fundamentalism seems on the wane, and a new generation of leadership apears more pragmatic and less wedded to the past than its predecessors.
422. Amaxen - July 26, 1999 - 9:58 AM PT
Wombat,
If that(deterrence) indeed were Israeli policy during the Yom Kippur war, then why were Israeli Nukes classified at the highest level of secrecy? You can't deter with a weapon the enemy does not know about. I think even the renowned expert on nuclear war, Dr. Strangelove, said somthing to this effect. Also, I remember reading that the Nukes were put on full alert (i.e. on planes, sitting on the runways, fueled, armed and ready) during the dark early days of the war, in such a manner as to indicate that Meir did plan to use them in case of an Israeli defeat. Basically, I am not disputing Israel's current policy of mini-deterrence, but rather the whole strategic concept of introducing an arms race in n-weapons; a game that
1. Clearly imposes more strategic disadvantage upon Israel than it conferrs, in the long run
2. Is expensive
3. Contains the possibility of alienating key allies
To me, this is similar (although not exactly) to Germany's engaging in a naval arms race w/England pre WWI -- pursuit of a security through means that are inappropriate to the need, and which may ultimately return to haunt the architects of the program some day.
423. Wombat - July 26, 1999 - 11:56 AM PT
The existance of Israeli nuclear weapons is one of those secrets that was not terribly secret. To admit it would subject Israel to pressure to participate in various international regimes that it would rather not be involved with.
Your comparison of Israel's development of nukes to the naval race leading up to World War I is in-apt. Given the circumstances of Israel's existence, a nuclear deterrent is extremely cost effective. Without it, they would probably have to have more of their forces on active duty instead of in the reserves, to the detriment of the economy.
What strategic disadvantage does it confer on Israel?
An Israeli nuclear deterrent does not antagonize the United States (the only ally that matters). The Israeli deterrent means that the United States will not face pressure to put Israel under the protection of its own nuclear umbrella.
The only part of your naval race parallel that is valid pertains to attempts by Israel's neighbors to develop a deterrent of their own. Since Israel does not threaten the existence of any of its neighbors, any attempt to match Israel's nuclear capablity is truly a waste of money and other resources that would serve to exacerbate the arms race that already exists.
424. PincherMartin - July 26, 1999 - 1:17 PM PT
Amaxen --
"If that(deterrence) indeed were Israeli policy during the Yom Kippur war, then why were Israeli Nukes classified at the highest level of secrecy? You can't deter with a weapon the enemy does not know about."
Wombat's answer is correct, but I would like to add that Israel would not only be pressured to participate in various international regimes, but it would be subject to automatic U.S. sanctions, that kick in when a state has a declared nuclear weapons capability.
"1. Clearly imposes more strategic disadvantage upon Israel than it conferrs, in the long run
2. Is expensive
3. Contains the possibility of alienating key allies"
1. Not true. Israeli strategists are already discussing whether Israel should chance the U.S. will not sanction their country too harshly, and just declare their nuclear weapons capability and build a second strike option (possibly by submarine). Even should an Arab state or Iran build a nuclear weapon, strategic deterrance would still hold.
2. Israel has the capability to produce fissile material already, and probably has 100 to 200 bombs. With the nuclear infrastructure in place, and a capable defense industry to build any second-strike option, how is it expensive?
3. To echo Wombat's comment, the only ally that matters is the U.S., and maybe Europe as a whole, and neither one of those powers appears willing to push Israel to give up its nuclear option.
But the most importnt thing you're forgetting is that even if Israel didn't exist or did not have nuclear weapons, there would still be efforts in Iran and Iraq to build nuclear weapons to both deter each other (or blackmail the other, if one of the two did not have the NW option), and to deter the U.S.
425. AzureNW - July 26, 1999 - 2:26 PM PT
"...Israel would not only be pressured to participate in various international regimes, but it would be subject to automatic U.S. sanctions, that kick in when a state has a declared nuclear weapons capability...."
In other words, lying about having nuclear weapons capability is just another way Israel subverts the laws of the American people, ripping us off and putting the world at risk to promote their Zionist agenda.
426. PincherMartin - July 26, 1999 - 2:43 PM PT
Azure --
It's not just Israel that has held an opaque nuclear capability -- India, Pakistan and South Africa have also had this policy. It's not so much lying as a legalism to avoid sanctions.
427. Amaxen - July 26, 1999 - 2:59 PM PT
Pincher and Martin:
First, Understand I am not talking about *current* Israeli strategic policy, but about their *past* poicy. Most histories I have read about the Y-K war indicate that Arab leaders were not aware that Israel had several N-weapons, and were not aware that Israel came very close to using them.
Second, their doctrine for N-weaps at that time could not have been 'deterrence' (i.e: Prevention of Nuclear attack by assured nuclear counterstrike) - for then the question would be who had the capability to initiate a nuclear strike upon Israel? I hardly think that Isreal feels it necessary to deter the Soviet Union, Britian, France, or the US.
This leads us back to my initial point: that Israel has moved (or at least hastened) the strategic calculus to a point that is against her long term interests. She cannot use the nuclear option first, no matter what the non-nuke justification, without losing the support of the US and the world. The act of acquiring and making known that she has a nuclear option can only spur and justify her potential opponents in their nuclear efforts. Introducing a nuclear arms race that it can only lose, (because of relative geographic and strategic factors) is folly. In short then, a case can be made that there is no real gain, and much to lose, as a result of Israel's strategic policy, and it is this that reminds me of Germany's policy of building a high seas fleet.
428. AzureNW - July 26, 1999 - 3:00 PM PT
PincherMartin -
India and Pakistan are not declared nuclear powers in spite of their very publicly conducting nuclear tests last year? I had seen reports that at least Pakistan was under US economic sanctions because their nuclear tests violated international treaties. (It was an issue for my region of the country because we sell Pakistan most of the wheat produced here.)
429. PincherMartin - July 26, 1999 - 3:36 PM PT
Amaxen --
"Most histories I have read about the Y-K war indicate that Arab leaders were not aware that Israel had several N-weapons, and were not aware that Israel came very close to using them."
Egypt was aware of Dimona from as early as the mid 60s when Nasser threatened to destroy the place (he sent reconnaisance flights over it several times), and it apparently deterred them from anything egregious in the 1973 war. If Egypt was aware, I find it hard to believe that the other Arabs states were not aware as well, but I'll keep looking. (Source: _Israel and the Bomb_ by Avner Cohen)
The scholarshp I've read (Shai Feldman or Gerald Steinberg, I can't remeber which one) suggests that the Egyptians were not deterred from the 1973 war, but were indeed deterred from some of their war aims, What those were exactly, I can't remember. That same monogram also argues that Iraq was deterred from using CW armed SCUDs against Israel during the Persian Gulf War out of the fear there would be a nuclear retaliation.
"Second, their doctrine for N-weaps at that time could not have been 'deterrence' (i.e: Prevention of Nuclear attack by assured nuclear counterstrike) - for then the question would be who had the capability to initiate a nuclear strike upon Israel? I hardly think that Isreal feels it necessary to deter the Soviet Union, Britian, France, or the US."
If your point is that this case doesn't fit the classical theory of deterrence, then I agree, but so what. It obviously deters a convential existential threat against Israel from the Arabs.
430. Amaxen - July 26, 1999 - 3:58 PM PT
" deters a convential existential threat against Israel from the Arabs."
. . But does it? If you argue that the Arabs were aware of Israeli nuclear capability, then they were not deterred from a conventional surprise attack, were they? If, on the other hand, it was kept secret, then for what purpose?
431. Amaxen - July 26, 1999 - 4:02 PM PT
Still the essential underlying strategic delimma remains: Israel has been able to defeat numerically superior forces by maintaining a qualitatively high military force and by the use of a powerful ally. Pushing the contest into the nuclear arena negates much of Israel's advantages. Why Israel would do this cannot really be explained in terms of strategy: It can be explained more easily on the grounds of national glory and muddy strategic thinking, much the same excuses for German battleship building.
432. PincherMartin - July 26, 1999 - 4:02 PM PT
Amaxen --
"This leads us back to my initial point: that Israel has moved (or at least hastened) the strategic calculus to a point that is against her long term interests. She cannot use the nuclear option first, no matter what the non-nuke justification, without losing the support of the US and the world. The act of acquiring and making known that she has a nuclear option can only spur and justify her potential opponents in their nuclear efforts. Introducing a nuclear arms race that it can only lose, (because of relative geographic and strategic factors) is folly. In short then, a case can be made that there is no real gain, and much to lose, as a result of Israel's strategic policy, and it is this that reminds me of Germany's policy of building a high seas fleet."
I don't think you have a case at all, and I agree with nothing in this section.
"This leads us back to my initial point: that Israel has moved (or at least hastened) the strategic calculus to a point that is against her long term interests."
Israel has had a nuclear weapon for close to -- if not over -- thirty years Since that time, there has been one overt war by Israel's neighbors against the Jewish state (Lebanon doesn't count, since it was low-intensity until Israel invaded in 1982, and has been low-intensity since), that was right after Israel weaponized its nuclear option. There is evidence that the bomb deterred Egypt from pursuing more aggressive war aims in that war.
433. PincherMartin - July 26, 1999 - 4:03 PM PT
During those thirty years (which has to be defined "long term" by anyone), not one of Israel's neighbors has been able to acquire a nuclear weapon, and two (Egypt and Syria) have discontinued programs. Iraq had a serious nuclear weapons' program and was very close to making the bomb, but there is evidence that Iran was as much a target as Israel. Similarly, Iran may have a nuclear weapons' program, but their concerns may be a rejuvenated Iraq and the U.S. as much as it is Israel.
"She cannot use the nuclear option first, no matter what the non-nuke justification, without losing the support of the US and the world. The act of acquiring and making known that she has a nuclear option can only spur and justify her potential opponents in their nuclear efforts."
Again, if Israel's existence is threatened, why would she care whether she would lose the support of the U.S. and the world? Also, everyone already knows about Israel's nuclear weapons, and as I reported above, there is strong evidnce that nuclear proliferation in the Middle East would continue even if Israel's nuclear weapons didn't exist.
"Introducing a nuclear arms race that it can only lose, (because of relative geographic and strategic factors) is folly."
The relative strategic and geographic factors are in your imagination. As I said, Israeli strategists are considering puttinga second-strike option onto a submarine. Also, the Arab states seeming large sizes in relation to Israel is negated by the fact that many of them have their population and industry concentrations in particular areas, and thus are still vulnerable to nuclear attack in the same manner as Israel is. Egypt, for example, could be effectively wiped out with just a handful of bombs. Despite the fact it is a very large country in size, the population centers are concentrated in just a few areas.
434. PincherMartin - July 26, 1999 - 4:09 PM PT
Azure --
"India and Pakistan are not declared nuclear powers in spite of their very publicly conducting nuclear tests last year? I had seen reports that at least Pakistan was under US economic sanctions because their nuclear tests violated international treaties. (It was an issue for my region of the country because we sell Pakistan most of the wheat produced here.)"
My key word in that post was "had", as in past tense. India had exploded a nuclear device (called a peaceful nuclear explosion) as early as 1974, and had a bomb, it is believed, for some time before their nuclear test. Thus, like Israel, India for a time had an opaque nuclear weapons capability.
435. PincherMartin - July 26, 1999 - 4:12 PM PT
Amaxen --
"Why Israel would do this cannot really be explained in terms of strategy: It can be explained more easily on the grounds of national glory and muddy strategic thinking, much the same excuses for German battleship building."
You seemed fixated on this German example rather than investigating the Israeli one. The Israeli and German examples simply don't match.
436. Amaxen - July 26, 1999 - 6:04 PM PT
Well, partly it is an attempt to stay on topic, since Pike seemed to be determined to mention Israel in most of his posts. And no, they do not wholly match. However, I see quite a few parallels between the concepts of the State and its relation to the citizen between Israel and pre Wilhelmine Germany, all the same. I chose the nuclear issue because it seems to be undefendable from a strategic, but not necessarily a political, point of view, rather as the dreadnaught building policy made sense to the pre-WWI German political leadership. The contradictions in Martin's analyses seem obvious to me: If Israel were to first strike Egypt, for example, it could count on being piled on by most of the nations of the world, including, conceivably, the US. If Israel were to follow a policy of gotterdamerung in preference to occupation, it is hard to see how the result would be better than surrender. At any rate, the main question is begged: Israel would lose a great deal more out of any kind of WMD exchange than any single one or combination of its conceivable opponents. It is hard for me to see how this could possibly be disputed.
437. PincherMartin - July 26, 1999 - 6:44 PM PT
Amaxen --
"The contradictions in Martin's analyses seem obvious to me: If Israel were to first strike Egypt, for example, it could count on being piled on by most of the nations of the world, including, conceivably, the US."
This is ridiculous. Where are the contradictions? Do you even read what you respond to?
438. rustlerpike - July 27, 1999 - 10:31 PM PT
A question to PM (or anyone else):
If a viable anti-nuclear defense system becomes a possibility (and I assume that this would have to involve both an anti-missile missile like the Arrow, and some kind of effective shelter system) - doesn't Israel's small size and concentration of population become an advantage (nuclear-strategy-wise)?
Wouldn't it be easier to protect a small area with a missile umbrella than a large one?
439. Wombat - July 28, 1999 - 11:33 AM PT
Rustler:
I suspect six of one, half dozen of the other. Israel would be easier to cover with such a system, but unless it worked perfectly, whatever got through would cause damage far beyond what the same "leakers" would if they hit the United States.
Amaxen:
You are substituting your opinions for facts in re Israel and nukes.
440. Amaxen - July 28, 1999 - 8:21 PM PT
Wombat,
I did not believe were were disputing facts. You are quite right in saying I am stating my opinion on Israeli Nuclear strategy. Your point? Or were you just attempting to counter my arguments via a rhetorical device?
Pike,
I doubt an SDI system would be of much utility in Israel's case, since nukes are quite easy to hand transport. All you would need would be to rent an office or warehouse, long term, and keep your remote-detonation bomb there.
Martin,
Let me restate my opinion in a nutshell for you. One, Israel is, due to geographical reasons, at a severe disadvantage in any type of WMD exchange, relative to her potential enemies.
Two, I believe her acquision of Nukes is a direct spur to her opponents to acquire them, for the same reasons as russia found it necessary to develop them after the US did.
Three, any use of WMDs against one of her opponents is likely to bring in the rest against her.
If you can't dispute these three assertions, then what possible conclusion can you reach as a result that differ from mine?
Here is my QED: The acquision of nukes by Israel was folly.
441. PincherMartin - July 29, 1999 - 4:00 AM PT
Amaxen --
You have reiterated three points which I have already destroyed, and the point you sought to prove, that Israel's acquisition of nuclear weapons was folly, remains an unsubstantiated claim.
But just to go over old ground with you, again:
1) "One, Israel is, due to geographical reasons, at a severe disadvantage in any type of WMD exchange, relative to her potential enemies."
False (or at least not as definitive as you believe). Israel is a smaller country than her neighbors, but each of her neighbors could also be wiped out in any nuclear exchange. As I mentioned before, Egypt's population concentration along the Nile is not a strategic advantage in a nuclear exchange. Iraq's power structure is also geographically limited, and vulnerable to any exchange of nukes.
While Israel's size *is* a strategic disadvantage, it is not as great as you suppose, and with the technological lead Israel has over its neighbors, even should they acquire nuclear weapons, it can finesse around any strategic disadvantage of small size by placing a second strike option aboard a submarine.
continued...
442. PincherMartin - July 29, 1999 - 4:02 AM PT
2. "Two, I believe her acquision of Nukes is a direct spur to her opponents to acquire them, for the same reasons as russia found it necessary to develop them after the US did."
Well, let's compare this: Russia acquired the nuclear bomb some four years after the U.S. used it on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Thirty years after Israel acquires a nuclear weapon, none of its continguous neighbors is acquiring one (Syria and Egypt no longer have nuclear weapons programs), and the two states in the region who seem to still want nuclear weapons (Iran, Iraq) have compelling reasons to acquire them even if Israel did not exist. One of those states (Iran) actually has a history of significant secret cooperation with the Jewish state. The incentives (as far as likely state-opponents) for these two states to go nuclear can be listed as follows (listed in order of importance):
Iran: Iraq; Pakistan, which is now nuclear-armed (Iran has a significant military presence on its southeastern border with Pakistan); the U.S.; Israel
Iraq: Iran, the U.S.; Israel
The Iran-Iraq war still looms large in the defense plans of the present regimes in those two countries. They have used one type of WMD -- chemical weapons -- against each other (with Iraq initiating it), and still view the opposing state as the prime threat to its own security. There is a large body of opinion that views the original decision to go nuclear by Iraq as stemming from the Iran-Iraq war, even though the Israelis destroyed the Osiraq reactor. Take away Israel from the region, and none of the states seeking to acquire nuclear weapons would hesitate for a moment before continuing that quest. On the other hand, by keeping the nuclear weapons and continuing to develop doctrine for future deterrance, Israel remains a step ahead of the other countries in the region who will one day almost certainly acquire nuclear weapons.
continued...
443. PincherMartin - July 29, 1999 - 4:02 AM PT
3. "Three, any use of WMDs against one of her opponents is likely to bring in the rest against her."
This point is irrelevant. Israel would never use any WMD unless its very existance was at stake, at which point what the rest of the world or region thinks or would do in the aftermath of such an event would be besides the point.
"If you can't dispute these three assertions, then what possible conclusion can you reach as a result that differ from mine?"
I have disputed all three, and consider your conceit that you think you understand Israel's security situation better than they do, especially given your demonstrated ignorance of the region that you have shown here, to be the most damning indictment of your position.
444. PincherMartin - July 29, 1999 - 4:16 AM PT
RustlerPike --
"If a viable anti-nuclear defense system becomes a possibility (and I assume that this would have to involve both an anti-missile missile like the Arrow, and some kind of effective shelter system) - doesn't Israel's small size and concentration of population become an advantage (nuclear-strategy-wise)?'
"Wouldn't it be easier to protect a small area with a missile umbrella than a large one?"
Actually, this is a good point. The only weakness in it is that I can't imagine an anti-missile system good enough that a potential opponent just couldn't inundate it with numerous missiles, which are much cheaper to produce than any anti-missile system that might work. If 200 chemically-armed SCUDs were fired into its area of concern, an anti-missile system which is 90% effective would still have 20 get through.
Amaxen --
"I doubt an SDI system would be of much utility in Israel's case, since nukes are quite easy to hand transport. All you would need would be to rent an office or warehouse, long term, and keep your remote-detonation bomb there."
You've been watching too much TV, Goofy.
445. Amaxen - July 29, 1999 - 10:14 AM PT
Pincher,
This is getting tiresome. We both seem to agree on the major points of my argument, but you seem to believe that your opinion can prevail by resolving at ever finer levels of detail. I don't have the time or the interest to go that route. I am as aware of the justifications for Israeli strategic policy as you are, I just don't buy them. It is not that there are no benefits to the current policy, I just maintain that the risks & costs outweigh them. As I said in my original post, my opinion of the policy is that it is folly. You haven't really given me any reasons to reconsider.
Oh, and BTW, why exactly do you dismiss the backpack nuke threat?
446. PincherMartin - July 29, 1999 - 10:32 AM PT
Amaxen --
"As I said in my original post, my opinion of the policy is that it is folly. You haven't really given me any reasons to reconsider."
I haven't seen any proof that you have even considered my arguments. When I read lines like this, "I believe her acquision of Nukes is a direct spur to her opponents to acquire them, for the same reasons as russia found it necessary to develop them after the US did." and then I give a very detailed response (twice), to which you cryptically respond with, first, something about my contradictions (which you conveniently leave unspecified), and, now, something about having no reason to reconsider your position. Fine, maintain the same ignorant frame of mind that allowed you to say that Israel's decision to acquire nuclear weapons could be compared to Germany's decision to acquire a fleet (including one gem where you said Israel and Germany both did it for glory).
"Oh, and BTW, why exactly do you dismiss the backpack nuke threat?"
Oh, no. Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice...
447. Amaxen - July 29, 1999 - 10:43 AM PT
Oooo, oooo, ooo. . .
Well, I suppose I am well and truly flamed My own fault for violating my own rules.
Well, as one of my own roommates used to say,
Goyim, Goyim, gone.
(From this topic)
448. RustlerPike - July 29, 1999 - 11:40 PM PT
Amaxen:
Aren't Jew taking this too personally?
Pincher Martin:
You're right about the 20 scuds - or 5, or 2 - 'leaking' in, but that's why I stipulated a serious shelter system in place also. There has been talk about building a subway system in Tel Aviv, for example, which could double as a mass shelter (I forget where it was discussed and by who, but it was in the media).
If you had most of the population in gas-proof, germ-proof, and reasonably nuke-proof shelters, with enough food stockpiled for them to live off for a while, and had a strong missile defense system (plus those invaluable x-ray machines in the airport and border crossings, to prevent Amaxen's suitcase nukes coming in!) - you'd be in a pretty strong bargaining position during that interval, wouldn't you?
449. ranheim - July 30, 1999 - 3:20 PM PT
Hey!
You guys discussing current Arab-Israeli politics : do you know anything about that portion of the world prior to; during; and just after WW I? I know that mandates were formed in the area. I know that the Brits were heavily involved. ??From the point of view of their interest in the Suez Canal + oil for their newly converted Navy?? Other reasons?
I don't know - give me your thoughts. I just have the impression that the Brits played an especially nasty form of divide and conqeor in this area. The Balfour Declaration was a particularly vicious document; best as I recall. Didn't that letter more or less invite Jewish immigration to the area; but, provided for no police or other protection?
450. Amaxen - July 30, 1999 - 5:18 PM PT
Pike,
Keep Is Rael, Baby.
451. Wombat - July 30, 1999 - 7:48 PM PT
The region east of the Suez Canal to the Persian Gulf was under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire (with the exception of Kuwait, which was a locally ruled British protectorate).
The British fomented rebellion of the Ottoman Empire's Arab subjects, promising them independence from Turkey. The Husseini family/or clan signed on, and with the help of T.E. Lawrence, made pests of themselves in what is now Syria and Jordan.
Unfortunately for the Arabs, the British and the French had already divided the region among themselves, with the French getting Syria and the Levant. This was news to Feisal, the younger Husseini, who thought he had been promised Syria. The French kicked him out, and the British put together Iraq for him to rule. The elder Husseini, Abdullah, ruled Mecca, until the Al Saud family rebelled and kicked him out. The British created Transjordan for him to rule.
Britain was given a League of Nations mandate to rule Palestine directly, until such a time as it was ready for self-rule.
452. pellenilsson - July 31, 1999 - 2:10 AM PT
Some additional information.
Please refer to Message #139 for the full text of the Balfour declaration.
The family name is Hashemi. Hussein was the Sharif of Mecca at the time of WW1.
In addition to Kuwait, UK also had a presence in Aden and in the United Arab Emirates, then known as the Trucial States.
Britain's and France's carving up of the Middle East was recorded in the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916. This document, the Balfour declaration and the 1956 attack on Egypt form the basis for the Arabs' deep distrust of the West.
The Yale Law School maintains an excellent collection of documents on the Palestine question.
453. RustlerPike - July 31, 1999 - 2:32 AM PT
ranheim:
The Fray Board of Recommendations has cited David Fromkin's "A Peace to End All Peace: Creating the Modern Middle East" as an excellent book on the subject.
As for the Balfour Dec. and British policy regarding the Jewish homeland idea: many Israelis would say it was unfair to the Jews, in that it gave 80% of the Palestine Mandate area - all of Transjordan - to the Arabs, while partitioning the remaining 20%. Also - the British prevented Jews from immigrating in any large numbers during the 30's, a quite inhuman policy which involved turning back refugee ships to Nazi territory.
454. RustlerPike - July 31, 1999 - 2:43 AM PT
Anyone wishing to contact Prof. Fromkin and ask him about the Balfour Declaration will find his cv and contact info here.
455. PincherMartin - Aug. 1, 1999 - 2:05 AM PT
RP --
Something for you on the topic we've been discussing here over in the international thread.
456. ranheim - Aug. 5, 1999 - 5:34 AM PT
R.I.P. has over-taken us.
I want to thank all of you who contributed to this thread. I have learned! Which is not true in many others.
457. pellenilsson - Aug. 5, 1999 - 6:56 AM PT
But R.I.P can be staved off for a little while and I hope it will because I think that although we have discussed the war, we have not discussed the peace.
I hope to get something together tomorrow or over the weekend.
458. ranheim - Aug. 5, 1999 - 9:05 AM PT
As has been pointed out in this thread previously, the absence of the USA in the League of Nations, doomed that organization to failure. Additionaly, this was the first attempt at a world wide organization of this type. Turns out, the League's main lasting value was as a learning experience for the formation of the UN.
I suspect some of you will disagree, but, my take on the USA between the wars was that it was isolationist. Only Hoover had any expertise in foreign affairs. Wasn't Harding an Ohio newspaper man; Coolidge the mayor of Boston?
Congress was involved in investigations of wartime profiteering; the "merchants of death". Topics hardly condusive to furthering foreign relations.
Have any of you seen a breakdown of USA books published; newspaper articles written; magazine articles written; etc. on any topic that even marginally dealt with international relations, trade, banking? (From Nov., 1918 to Dec., 1941). I would bet that the % would be very low. The "doings" of TR's first daughter - Alice - was of more interest to american readers than what was happening in Europe; the remainder of the world.
And then hard times/the depression was on everyone's mind in the '30s. FDR knew in the mid 30s that he wanted the USA in the war. But, he could not approach this subject directly due to adverse public opinion. His detractors say that he lied to the american people throughout the period from the beginning of the war in Europe until Pearl Harbor.
The more military oriented, I believe, will back me up in saying that the USA's military readiness for WW II was a joke. Manpower and equipment were allowed to stagnate.
A very long-winded way of saying that I doubt that there was much peace between the wars. None at all for those that believe that WW II was a continuation of WW I.
459. pellenilsson - Aug. 9, 1999 - 5:03 AM PT
I thought I'd get in some thoughts on the end of the war before the thread closes.
It is interesting to note that both in WW1 and WW2 the US didn't get into the act (in Europe) until Germany was well on its way to defeat. But the US intervention determined when the wars ended, to some extent how they ended and - to a large extent - the shape of the peace.
It must have been clear to the German high command (i.e. Ludendorff) that the entry of the US must mean defeat unless something drastic was done. Hence the so called Ludendorff offensives. Had they succeeded, the German would have become a tougher nut to crack and some kind of negotiated peace could have become a possibility. But they failed and, eventually, the Germans had to sue for piece.
On Ludendorff's insistence, it was not the high command that sued for piece, but the civilian government. That subterfuge by Ludendorff became the basis for the 'stab-in-the-back' myth (die Dolkstusslegende). The Army was undefeated, it still stood on foreign territory, but the civilians had betrayed it. The honour of the German soldier was upheld but the home front had failed. In a sense that was true. All myths include some truth. The home front did crumble under the recruitment to the front and the famine that threatened as a result of the blockade. There were strikes and violent socialist demonstrations in the streets.
Now to the peace. The UK and France had wanted to use the US troops to impose a complete defeat on the Germans and force an unconditional surrender. President Wilson stopped that. The Germans accepted the 14 points and the allies were forced to do the same when Colonel House told them that if not, the US might conclude a separate peace. Much of the Wilson programme was idealistic and impractical but at least he was of the firm opinion that the peace should not be an unjust one dictated by the victors.
460. pellenilsson - Aug. 9, 1999 - 5:06 AM PT
Wilson's big mistake was to go to Paris in person. His negotiating skills were far inferior to those of Lloyd George and Clemenceau. He had to watch as they imposed a punitive peace on Germany, including very high war reparations and occupation of the Ruhr industrial area. The UK and France did not only want the money, they wanted Germany to be crippled and kept down for ever.
It is not difficult to understand the reaction in Germany. Having been a major military, economic and cultural power it became an outcast with no realistic chance of recovery because of the punitive reparations. It is easy to say it was a fate deserved, but that does not take away the psychological impact. WW2 was not 'caused' by WW1. Nazism was not a consequence of the peace. But the peace created an environment where a movement like nazism could arise and spread, given the right incentives such as a charismatic leader.
Wilson did not see many of his ideals for self-determination implemented. In Europe, it was not his fault. The hotchpotch of intermingled ethnical groups there, in particular in the Balkans, made anything of the sort completely unrealistic. Yet, he - and the others - were fooled, or fooled themselves, into believing that there was such a thing as a South Slav identity. And so Yugoslavia (Yugo=south) was formed as a cover for Serbian ambitions for a Greater Serbia. The Czecho-Slovak state was perhaps more realistic, but with 3 million Sudeten Germans it carried the seeds of destruction within its own borders.
Poland re-appeared as a state after a long time, but in a more easterly location than now. There were a lot of White Russians and Ukrainians within its borders. This led to the almost forgotten Soviet-Polish war in 1920-23.
461. pellenilsson - Aug. 9, 1999 - 5:11 AM PT
Wilson was forced to watch how Lloyd George and Clemenceau carved up the Arab part of the Ottoman Empire between them and did the same with Germany's colonies in Africa. But he did not fail completely. He managed to stave off the worst excesses. The others could not completely ignore the views of Wilson and the country he represented. The territories the UK and France acquired were not colonies. They were Mandates to be managed on behalf of the League of Nations with a view to independence. The last Mandate to become independent (in 1990) was Namibia, which in 1919 came under the 'tutelage' of South Africa. People who have visited there say there is still a distinct German atmosphere in the capital, Windhoek.
Wilson's greatest triumph was the League of Nations, an international body for conflict resolution. But the US never joined, so it never became what it was intended to be.
462. ranheim - Aug. 9, 1999 - 5:12 AM PT
Thank you for #459 & 460
I knew very little about Europe in between the wars.
463. allaneq - Aug. 9, 1999 - 5:15 PM PT
Existing Fraygrants;
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464. theDiva - Aug. 10, 1999 - 1:43 PM PT
i'm tired of seeing his handle.
465. RustlerPike - Aug. 10, 1999 - 9:08 PM PT
Diva: people who tire of seeing people's handles do not need Penis Threads.