101. colossus - June 18, 1999 - 9:56 AM PT
Marshall Petain restored French morale by not engaging in any offensive operations and effectively promising that to the troops.
Having knocked Russia out of the war, German forces on the western front were augmented with battle hardened and rested Eastern troops. Without the offensive of 1918 the stalemate would have continued indefinitely inasmuch as the British/French could never have broken through German defenses as the Passchendale 2 and Cambrai demonstrated.
102. colossus - June 18, 1999 - 10:05 AM PT
The main german breakthrough in the Ludendorff offensives occured against Gen Gough's 5th army not the French 6th. The thrust at the Marne was an example of what i referred to as the lack of strategic direction by Ludendorff. Only when the British held, did the Germans turn against the French 6th Army and that, intitially, was an effort to split the French off from the Brits.
The Chemins des Dames offensive was actually the Third Ludendorff offensive.
Germany would not have had to undertake any offensives and probably, from the record of internal debates, would not have done so were it not for the expected arrival of the Americans.
Their manpower situation was better than the French and British combined. Foodstuffs from the Ukraine and oil from Rumania would have eliminated the only real problem for Germany - the effects of the British blockade.
103. colossus - June 18, 1999 - 10:14 AM PT
Analyzing the Great Memorandum of the Schliffen Plan Keegan proves that its defeat was within the 4 corners of the document because given the road network available and the distances involved the Great Right Wing could never have achieved its objective of enveloping Paris.
"The dream was of a whirlwind; the calculations warned of a dying thunderstorm....[without the envelopment the Plan warns] the French migh fall back into the 'great fortress' as which 'France must be regarded'; 'if the French give up the Oise and the Aisne and retreat behind the Marne, Seine etc...the war will be endless'" Keegan 34-35
104. colossus - June 18, 1999 - 10:20 AM PT
As Wombat points out, the problems of trench war, specifically of pentration and pursuit were demonstrated early on.
Specifically at the battle fo Neuve-Chapelle. Basically the advantage would shift to the defense soon after any breakthrough because artillery support was inadequate, communications via telephone line (cut) and runners (slow) made command and control impossible; the terrain (churned by artillery bombardment) favored the defense etc. etc....counterattacks met the same dynamic.
105. jroth2 - June 18, 1999 - 11:10 AM PT
So many good points and so little time.... I have my youngest with me this weekend so this has to be fast:
1.) Colossus; Fortifications were the dominant weapon system in European war until the advent of gunpowder. There followed a long period of transition as the architects learned new methods and the guns increased in caliber. Eventually, a condition much like the nuclear stand-off was attained; the Herman Kahn of the 18th century was Vauban; he was the accomplished master of fortification AND of the means by which fortifications could be reduced. The whole process became so refined that it was reduced to mathematical formulae. BTW, even a good fortification left the surrounding countryside open to a logistics wasting strategy on the part of the attacker.
2.) I believe several of us are saying the same thing wrt the last German offensives in the West. The new storm tactics restored some of the advantage of offensive shock action, but the Germans had not the forces or the doctrine to succesfully exploit the openings created. They did have tanks (a picture of one is in the Keegan book) but did not have the tactical doctrine worked out for their use.
3.) I think the metaphor of exhausted heavyweights is a good one. All the major combattants were in extremis. The American entry provided hope as well as material and men.
106. pellenilsson - June 18, 1999 - 11:15 AM PT
colossus - Message #88
'"In part I think American entry in the War was
conditioned by a certain superiority that the US generally
felt over the Europeans."
Was that feeling that well developed that early?
107. pellenilsson - June 18, 1999 - 11:18 AM PT
colossus - June 18, 1999 - 9:41 AM PT
"In a war based on the attrition of
humans, Germany was at a demographic disadvantage"
Only if you count the Russians."
The data I have are 60+ million people for the Germans versus 80+ for France and the UK. I admit I don't have the figures for men of fighting age, nor how of many would have become of age in say 1917-22.
108. pellenilsson - June 18, 1999 - 11:20 AM PT
Ranheim -- Message #93
Good post. 1917 was indeed a momentous year.
109. colossus - June 18, 1999 - 11:20 AM PT
Yes Pelle, it was a cultural arrogance on this side of the pond. There really was no sudden emergence of isolationism in the US after WWI it was there, implicit in the attitude first "we're too moral to get involved in decadent Euro War", then after unrestricted sub war, Z telegram etc it became "OK we didn't want to but now we must correct you nuts"
The war wasn't a creation of gun manufacturer merchants of death. It was warmly embraced by the man in the street, and that man at bottom was and to some extent still is isolationist IMO
110. colossus - June 18, 1999 - 11:22 AM PT
Jroth2 re: Vauban -
West Point was first an engineering school. The science of fortification.
Can I get into the Army War College for a PG degree?:)
111. colossus - June 18, 1999 - 11:25 AM PT
Let me check Pelle...I know France was seriously behind but to Germany you must add AH don't forget.
Besides everyone knows that 1 German = 2 Brits, 4 Frogs, 5 Itis, 6 Russians and 34 Swedes.
112. colossus - June 18, 1999 - 11:28 AM PT
I hope I can find time to tackle Doc Brown's timeline - some entries seem far-fetched, some I have forgotten what they are about. Also I want to check out that Lions of July Book I mentioned. It goes through what must be each scrap of paper July 1914 and is hell on Paleologue and the Revanchist French assholes.
All this and I still have to finish Tuchman's 100 years war book and Panzer Leader which is always checked out from SFPL so I must read first.
I hope this thread lasts a while.
113. colossus - June 18, 1999 - 11:32 AM PT
Jroth -
Germany had shitty tanks and few of those. They tried to use tanks in the Ludendorff offensive, 4th one in the north I believe, but most of those were British.
I suspect that had the Germans had the luxury of time, they would have built more tanks and worked out tactics but they had to bust ass to beat the 1,000,000 fresh fat doughboys to the Front.
114. Wombat - June 18, 1999 - 11:33 AM PT
Pelle:
That feeling has been around since the foundation of the US.
Colossus:
Petain promised his troops that they would not be thrown away in undersupported and unlimited offensives a la Nivelle. French troops took part part in extensively planned and supported, limited offensives. It could be argued that Petain was the general best fitted to command under WWI conditions (ironically, this had hurt his career before the war, equally ironically, he was De Gaulle's patron between the wars, although De Gaulle's--and Guderian's and Fuller's theories doomed the French in WWII).
By the end of 1917, nothing except a massive infusion of German troops would have saved Austria Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey (in Iraq and Palestine).
115. pellenilsson - June 18, 1999 - 1:39 PM PT
colossus
Yes I forgot about AH and that in itself has some significance. What did they do? Messing about in the Balkans and the Alps and some weak efforts on the eastern front, that's all. Insignificant in the larger picture.
116. ranheim - June 18, 1999 - 3:05 PM PT
For colossus
Does SFPL = San Francisco Public Library? Are your descendents from California? I was born and raised in rural MN. There is NO WAY that your statement that the man on the street "warmly embraced" WW I was true there. Rural MN in the early part of the 1900s hated the Minneapolis/StPaul banks; the two dominant railroads; and the people that were to become Cargill. I don't think I have to explain why farmers hated those 3 groups. Rural MN, except for the sycophants sucking on Minneapolis' teat, was superbly isolationalist.
And with the passing of the oppressive Espionage Act of June, 1917 the isolation turned into hatred. It was between June, 1917 and the end of the war that my grandfather's out-buildings were "painted" yellow. In case you missed it previously, my name is not German; it is Norwegian. But, the fools who worked for the powers-that-be in Minneapolis could not distinguish; or preferred not to. My grandfather did not lose his farm; but, several of his friends had their farms "confiscated" by Minneapolis banks. The area around my grandfather's farm - for miles - was Scandanavian; not German. But, punks and bully-boys were hired by city-wealth. From talking with other people from states surrounding MN, pretty much the same thing occurred in those states as well. This is an extremely sad time in rural America! Police state tactics were definitely in use.
The Democratic Party was hated. Minneapolis/St.Paul was hated; and, indirectly, that hatred extended to politicians in Washington. That is the main reason for the semantic Democrat-Farmer/Labor Party in MN. I have lived in LA for 30 years so I am not sure, but, I believe that name survives to this day.
117. jroth2 - June 18, 1999 - 4:20 PM PT
Ranheim,
Very interesting tour d' horizon of the isolationist attitudes common in the Midwest. Areas, such as Wisconsin, which had large populations of German descent certainly opposed entry. As did Irish immigrants due to a genetic hatred of the English. BTW, one branch of my family has its roots in Mankato, Minnesota.
Going back to the timeline of events: Did Germany have time to transfer sufficient numbers from the Eastern Front to the Western? Would they have turned the tide if they had been fully re-deployed? If so, perhaps America's entry really did save the day.
What I confess ignorance of is any attempts to end the war through negotiations- secret or otherwise- prior to 1918. Has anyone read of anything along these lines?
118. jroth2 - June 18, 1999 - 4:27 PM PT
Colossus,
Not that i want to get you started on this thread, but in reading the Keegan book I ran across his description of the Serbian army, circa 1913. Do you think Keegan wrote those passages in light of the current conflict?
BTW, some of the staff colleges take a limited number of students from other parts of 'the national security community'. Perhaps we can get you started in a second career. How are your languages?
119. ranheim - June 18, 1999 - 4:54 PM PT
#118
I will get to "The Inquiry" later. My understanding is that "Col. House" was told to get the Inquiry under-way by Wilson due to some diplomatic moves by the Pope. But, I am not positive of that.
I've never been sure. Does the name Col. House come from some honorary Texas rank? Or did he actually hold that rank in the US military?
120. ranheim - June 18, 1999 - 6:02 PM PT
For colossus
I made your descendents come before you; and as an M.D. I know that would be quite tricky! Please substitute "antecedents".
121. colossus - June 19, 1999 - 11:06 AM PT
"By the end of 1917, nothing except a massive infusion of
German troops would have saved Austria Hungary"
Not so. The Russians were fleeing the front in droves at the end of 1917 eager to return to their villages for all the land Lenin had promised them. The only problem AH had at that time were the Iti's at the Isono River and they were on what, their 13th failed offensive?
No AH's problems were internal at the end of 1917 especially lack of food which was a main reason German negotiators at Brest-Litovsk insisted on getting the Ukraine. They were unable to properly digest the spoils because of the ill-advised Ludendorff offensives undertaken in the hopes that the French/Brits could be broken before US troops came on line.
Though Petain was certainly a great general and later a fine Nazi collaborator [:)], what broke the back of Germany were the Ludendorff offensives not Marshall Petain. Had the US not entered the war and the Offensives not been undertaken, I think it a very good bet that the stalemate would have continued and possibly Germany secured a victory inasmuch as it now had the raw materials which the Blockade had so deprived it for the past 3-4 years.
As for Turkey, it was never more than a way for the Central Powers to divert and waste British resources. The British position in Iraq was a disaster though not of Gallipolli dimension, a serious drain and loss nonetheless.
122. colossus - June 19, 1999 - 11:08 AM PT
Ranheim -
My relatives come from California, Pennsylvania and Louisiana.
Yes I'll stand by my statement that the War was warmly embraced in the US except, perhaps, Minnesota and other areas with German sympathizers.
Hey I would have been a member of the Bund too. Ask Rosie! :^}
123. colossus - June 19, 1999 - 11:17 AM PT
"Not that i want to get you started on this thread, but in reading the Keegan book I ran across his description of the Serbian army, circa 1913. Do you think Keegan wrote those passages in light of the current conflict?"
Possibly not the current conflict given the publication date but certainly the Bosnian Butchery! Did I ever share my feelings on the Serbian people?
Wait till you get to the moving tale of how old King Peter (whose predecessors the Slerb army chopped in pieces to throw to an eager crowd) and the "War Leader" had to flee to Albania in 1915.
I was almost in tears!
"BTW, some of the staff colleges take a limited number of students from other parts of 'the national security community'. Perhaps we can get you started in a second career. How are your languages?"
Languages powerful in potential, weak in practice. I am good but a California lawyer has little use for anything but Spanish.
I am shopping a career change BTW. But could hardly imagine anything with less of a market these days than good ole fashioned war mongering.
I think I would have been happy in Ludendorff's world. He had a theory of the joy, glory and practice of perpetual war did you know that?
124. colossus - June 19, 1999 - 11:21 AM PT
"What I confess ignorance of is any attempts to end the war through negotiations- secret or otherwise- prior to 1918. Has anyone read of anything along these lines?"
JarheadRoth2 -
Yes. Wilson, in 1916 I think, tried to bring about a cease fire and to mediate a settlement. He asked both sides for their proposals.
Of course the French wanted Alsace-Lorraine. The German industrialists Krupp et al pressured the government for insisting on making Belgium some sort of satellite-protectorate and securing from France the coal and iron regions it did not already have plus colonies.
Small wonder you've not read about settlement efforts eh?
125. pellenilsson - June 19, 1999 - 1:18 PM PT
colussus
"Yes. Wilson, in 1916 I think, tried to bring about a cease fire and to mediate a settlement. He asked both sides for their proposals."
He did not. He asked for their *war aims* and got nothing of import in return. More evidence of folly. They didn't have any except for France which, as you note, wanted Alsace-Lorraine back.
Your little aside about Turkey in Message #121 will cause me to post something of substance (IMO) but not tonight.
126. ranheim - June 19, 1999 - 3:15 PM PT
No one has relatives living at the time of the 1916 election so we must rely on accounts written in that period. It was a given prior to the election that for Wilson to beat the bland Republican (Charles Evans Hughes : later Secy of State under Harding and still later a Supreme Court Justice)he had to have the support of the pacifists. The east was going to vote for Hughes (and they did). Wilson won the election by 590,000 out of 17.666 million cast; 277 electoral votes to 254. He won in the midwest and west of the Miss. River by way of two groups of people : The Bull Moose voters of 1912 who refused to vote for Hughes + the pacifists. Remember Wilson's slogan of 1916 : "He kept us out of war!" So the Democratic Party was, ostensibly, the party of pacificism; the Republicans with big business behind them in the east, the party of war.
I return to the speed with which Wilson changed from the pacifictic Democratic Convention of June, 1916 to declaring war in April, 1917. For all of my 60+ years I have been told, 'when facts seem not to match, follow the money'. The only 'big money" of those months was the PRIVATE loans by the east coast bankers - led by the House of Morgan - to the various allied countries. I believe that I have read that the House of Morgan by itself had loaned more than $1 billion; a tremendous sum in 1916. Others had loaned like amounts. When war was declared, these loans were "nationalized". The bankers received Libety Bonds as their payment.
The 2nd Liberty Bond Act (1917) had a very interesting provision. With that act Congress delegated authority to the Dept. of Treasury the ability to approve debt UP TO A SPECIFIED CEILING. (Congress, by times, continues to raise this ceiling in modern days.) Up to that time, Congress had to, case by case, approve additions to the debt of the USA. I think the timing is intriguing!
This transaction was not secret; just no publicity!
127. jroth2 - June 19, 1999 - 3:38 PM PT
Well, Ranheim, you can add to your list of ominous occurences the introduction of the income tax in 1913 and the creation of the Federal Reserve at about the same time.
To return to the Thread; I take it your conclusion is that Wilson's abrupt reversal was due to pressure from Wall Street? The point is that Morgan, et. al. would be out the loans if the Germans won?
I think it possible that Wilson mixed idealism with realpolitik (the usual combination in American Foreign Policy), and decided that a world in which Germany dominated Europe would be inimical to America's long-term interests. Essentially he may have been influenced by the geo-politicians like MacKinder and believed that a German victory would eventually result in a hostile Europe that could threaten the New World.
If my conjecture is true it certainly implies some long-term strategizing on his part since the only weapon system of that time that could concievably threaten America was the British Fleet.
128. jroth2 - June 19, 1999 - 3:50 PM PT
Colossus,
Yes, there was a theory that war invigorated a nation- it was part of the social Darwinism of the time promulgated by types like H. Spencer. The problem was that everyone believed the war would be a short, vigorous affair. I doubt anyone would have had an appetite for the 4 years of trench misery which followed.
The success of the European paradigm in warmaking against indigenous peoples was one of the central sources of European pride and self-confidence. After a generation bled out along 475 miles of trench, Europe's confidence and sense of purpose was shattered.
Perhaps the real story of WWI is that it set the stage for the rise of the Wing Powers; America and Russia, as foretold by DeTocqueville one hundred years prior. In this telling, Hitler's mad drive for European Hegemony represented the last hope for a Eurocentric world. Certainly Hitler believed that Germany's historical mission was nothing less than the salvation of European heritage from the brute materialisms of East and West. Imagine him thinking along these lines while serving in the trenches.
129. jroth2 - June 19, 1999 - 3:53 PM PT
Colossus,
Yes, Keegan is less than complimentary of the Serbs. The characterisation on page 48 must have tickled you.
130. CalGal - June 19, 1999 - 3:57 PM PT
"No one has relatives living at the time of the 1916 election so we must rely on accounts written in that period. "
You're not serious, are you? My grandmother is alive and was 11 years old at that time.
It's hardly relevant; it just caught my eye. There are a goodly amount of nonagenarians and century club members these days.
131. colossus - June 19, 1999 - 4:40 PM PT
JR,
I don't really like Serbs. Have I told you? tsk tsk tsk
Many will find this difficult to accept, but there's a great deal I do not know. For instance, I knew that Serbs were pig farmers by natural ethnographic inclination, and have advocated they be returned to their primeval state.
However, I did not know until I read "The Long Fuse"@trenches on the web, the link Doc Brown urges, that AH had a PIG WAR with Serbia.
This is a great list. I recommend it.
A little known cause of the Great War:
"The Hapsburg Monarchy could never allow the creation of a Greater Serbia."
Austrian Foreign Minister Agenor von Goluchowski, 1906
The Pig War was not a conflict waged on a battlefield. It was a confrontation of the economic variety brought about by Austria-Hungary in an attempt to put an end to the Pan-Serb movement, and, hopefully, Serbia itself. It is mentioned here because it was the incident that tainted diplomatic relations between the countries and created the atmosphere that would lead to the events of 28-Jun-1914 in Sarajevo.
Austria-Hungary had carefully planned the economic dependence of its Slav neighbor since the 1870's. By 1903 a whopping 90 percent of Serbia's foreign trade was with the Hapsburg empire. ***This disproportionate trade was mostly in the form of livestock, mainly pigs.*** While this "guaranteed trade" situation was not without benefit for Serbia, many Serbs felt, and rightfully so, that it impeded Serbian industrial growth.
[Thus my Pastoral Pig Farm Proposal!]
132. colossus - June 19, 1999 - 4:41 PM PT
In 1906 the Austrians decided to take advantage of the situation and apply an economic stranglehold by stopping the import of all Serbian ivestock. The Pig War had begun and would continue for five years with unexpected results for both sides. The Serbians reacted quickly by opening new trade with Egypt, Greece, Turkey and Germany. That's right, Germany. It seems the Germans knew a good pig price when they saw one. By the end of the embargo's first year, the Serbians were exporting more livestock than ever before. Their economy was booming. Vienna could only look on in disbelief.
Public opinion outside the empire turned against Austria-Hungary since they were now viewed as bullies. Within the empire, the Magyars were less than pleased. This was a policy invented in Vienna that was having monetary implications in Budapest. It was also clear that this was an open affront to Slavs in general and Serbs in particular. The Pig War had divided the Monarchy.
The Pig War would be forgotten to the events that would follow but it is an interesting case study in a foreign policy gone very wrong.
133. colossus - June 19, 1999 - 4:45 PM PT
"I doubt
anyone would have had an appetite for the 4 years of
trench misery which followed."
Ludendorff did. The stuff about his Theory of Perpetual War I read about was attributed to him during 1916-17 and after.
He was one Kold Kraut.
134. colossus - June 19, 1999 - 4:49 PM PT
Message #130
Cal,
What does granny recall? I can recall a great deal about the Cuban Missile Crisis when I was 11.
Mine are dead though my maternal grand pere was in the USArmy ready to ship @ Armistice. He was very proud to serve but pissed he missed the fun being Louisiana French and all.
135. ranheim - June 19, 1999 - 7:19 PM PT
jroth2
Until someone gives me a better theory of why Wilson acted the way he did, I will continue to believe that the east coast banks could not see how their loans could or would be repayed following a war in which all parties were exhausted : personnel and money making potential. Europe did not have nearly so far to go in recovery following WW I as compared to WW II. But, it was a daunting task for that day.
Its almost as if the war started by mistake. One cannot mobilize a huge army and have same on a high alert status, rubbing shoulders with its opponent just across a border. I was a Flight Surgeon in the USAF through most of the 60s. Historians will be more accurate than my recollections, but, the USA was extremely cautious in going to DEFCON 1 (defence condition 1 was the USA in a "pre-war" state of alert). We were there for a time during the Cuban Missle Crisis and I don't think that was repeated while I was on active duty (until 1971).
So, it appears to me that the USA learned from the experience of WW I.
The Central Powers were more ready than our allies : Britain and France. England, as usual, had its huge navy. And that navy was to keep the Central Powers bottled up the entire war. With the fall of the Tsar, however, the Central Powers obtained access to the Ukraine; which would have been a source of food for a continuing war. But, they were broke and out of men. As were France and the UK. There would have been a diplomatic peace - similar to those of the past couple of centuries in Europe.
Until Wilson caused the USA to come in on the side of UK and France! I can see no reason that an exchange of e.g. Alsace and Lorraine; would have affected Standard Oil's ability to sell kerosene overseas.
Some of you have hinted that Wilson's ego was so great that a portion of his reasoning was that he wanted a "seat at the table" following the war. Is that tenable? Will we ever know?
136. AuNaturel - June 19, 1999 - 9:54 PM PT
"The problem was that everyone believed the war would be a short, vigorous affair. I doubt anyone would have had an appetite for the 4 years of trench misery which followed."
Doesn't that sound amazingly like the US Civil War?
137. AuNaturel - June 19, 1999 - 10:12 PM PT
"Some of you have hinted that Wilson's ego was so great that a portion of his reasoning was that he wanted a "seat at the table" following the war. Is that tenable?"
I believe that Wilson saw this as the opportunity to secure a *permanent* seat at the European table. Throughout our brief history we had been constantly repelling European inroads into the west and defending the Monroe doctrine. This was an opportunity to reverse the role - and be welcomed in doing so - was a natural follow up to Teddy's Great White Fleet world tour.
WWI also saw the most horrific violations of the Constitution since the Civil War. The crack down on organized labor (note the "Wobblies") was probably even worse than the Nissei internment of WWII.
138. pellenilsson - June 20, 1999 - 2:52 AM PT
121. colossus - June 19, 1999 - 11:06 AM PT
In Message #121 colossus writes:
"As for Turkey, it was never more than a way for the
Central Powers to divert and waste British resources."
The British created their own diversion by encouraging the Arabs to rise against the Turks under the leadership Husein, the Sherif (or Sharif) of Mecca, that is the guardian of the holy place there and in Medina. This was the Arab Revolt, much romanticised by Lawrence. It had consequnces which are with us today, one of which is the Arabs' distrust of the Western Powers.
Husein was led to believe that the defeat of Turkey would lead to the emergence of an Arab state under the leadership of the Hashemites. But in fact the duplicitous British and the French had arrived at the Sykes-Picot agreement which divided the region into 'mandates' (a nicer word for colonies) under their control. The Arabs saw that as an outright betrayal of what they had fought for.
The other thing was the Balfour declaration which promised the Jews a homeland in Palestine. I think that although most people have heard of it but few have read it. Go to the next post.
139. pellenilsson - June 20, 1999 - 3:03 AM PT
The Balfour declaration of November 2, 1917:
Dear Lord Rothchild,
I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has
been submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet.
His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.
I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.
Signed: Arthur James Balfour
Here is the source. (I have corrected a couple of typos.)
A brief document with a big impact. From the Arab's point of view it was a betrayal in the first place and its very own provision that "nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine" was betrayed from day one.
The above illustrates, I think, my argument that nothing of today's politics in western Eurasia can be understood without a grasp of WWI.
140. rustlerpike - June 20, 1999 - 4:06 AM PT
pelle:
Are you bringing up the Balfour Declaration apropos something specific that was under discussion in this thread?
141. ranheim - June 20, 1999 - 6:04 AM PT
#137
One of my favorite curmudgeons - H.L. Mencken - was still frothing at the mouth 20 years later in regard the conduct of the US Government during WW I. A portion of his reputation was garnered by his rants on this subject.
Washington D.C. was afraid of German-Americans; Irish-Americans; newspapers; demands made by labor; almost everything. Therefore, the horrible repression. In regard censorship of newspapers (keep in mind that many were closed), one wag said in regard Postmaster General Burleson "he can't tell the difference between socialism and rheumatism". Burleson was an extremely important figure as he could - and did - revoke a newspapers right to be mailed at 2nd class postage rates. There was also a strange act passed in October, 1917, a "Trading With The Enemy Act". One of its provisions was that Burleson could demand that any newspaper that was printed in a foreign language be translated into English. And with all the new immigrants, there were scores of these small newspapers, written in the languages of the various immigrants, that Burleson closed down.
The I.W.W. was a favorite whipping boy as the men of money were deathly afraid of their attempts at forming unions.
142. wexxford1 - June 20, 1999 - 6:29 AM PT
The " Murdoch " name was made in WWI through Fleet Street Flackery . yes, fraygrants. yer favorite American-Australian media tycoon, Rupert'Digger" murdoch can trace his tycoonery back to his father's job as a messenger boy for Fleet Street on the Australian armed forces in the Middle East. After the Aussies were slaughtered like flies by the German-led Turks, Fleet Street needed an Aussie name as a byline. Murdoch's father, then a messenger boy,was made into a brand name by the Times and other Fleet Street trash papers. ' Our gallant Aussie lads " and such crap appeared under the elder Murdoch name. A fter performing as a flack,old man Murdoch was sent back to
Australia wheere he became a baby tycoon. Rupert grew up in a household where, thanks to WWI,newspapers( and radio) were considered sales vehicles for propaganda and products.The Aussie model was more American than British, with soap operas to keep the Aussie women morons marching . WWI is the real breeding ground for media hype and brand selling. The nonsense you read about Kosovo and the Yugos was first scripted by the gallant allies about them shitty Germans raping gallant little Belgium . Ferguson's great book about WWI, just out, shows how silly war propaganda was swallowed by the poor nationalist fools who were killing one another by the million--and getting shot if they deserted... The News Corp-Murdoch phenomenon can be directly traced to WWI, when Britain's need for Aussie-targeted hype in the 1914-1918 dustup was created.Indeed, Rupert's nickname = 'Digger'= derives from the fact that the poor deluded Aussies had to dig, dig,dig at Gallipoli --only to have the Turks beat the crap out of them. The Empire needed to spill blood,so the Aussies were among those selected for slaughter. So kiddies, the equation is : Propaganda , no matter how silly it may seem , keeps the morons marching. Twas brought to a science in WWI.Rock on.
143. jroth2 - June 20, 1999 - 10:31 AM PT
Propaganda works best if the distance it must move the masses' minds is small. Thus it is a small step from the fervent nationalism of the pre-war period to the War propaganda which demonised opponents.
From the viewpoint of our more cynical time the war propaganda seems almost quaint- it is hard to imagine that the inartful posters persuaded hundreds of thousands to enlist to serve in a war which they poorly understood.
144. AuNaturel - June 20, 1999 - 11:59 AM PT
"WWI is the real breeding ground for media hype and brand selling."
Uh, remember the Maine?
145. cllrdr - June 20, 1999 - 12:10 PM PT
THERE'S A GUN SHOW GOIN' ON IN U.S. POLITICS. LOCK AND LOAD WITH YOUR FAVORITE FRAYSTER.
146. pellenilsson - June 21, 1999 - 1:56 AM PT
rustlerpike - Message #140
"Are you bringing up the Balfour Declaration apropos
something specific that was under discussion in this
thread?"
No. I brought it and the Sykes-Picot agreement up because they were consequences of WWI which had a major impact on the course of history in the region.
The 'above' in "The above illustrates" refers to both posts. Sorry, if that was unclear.
147. pellenilsson - June 21, 1999 - 3:43 AM PT
ranheim -- Message #119
You asked about Col House.
In a book I have (Swedish) I found that Edward Mandell House was a millionaire from Texas who got his 'title' in the 1890's after he had organised a winning campaign for somebody (name not given) to become governor of the state.
He is characterised as a man in search of somebody who he could make into president and then control. But I suppose the man is well known in the US so I shall not go on.
148. ranheim - June 21, 1999 - 5:28 AM PT
pelle
Thank you
149. Wombat - June 21, 1999 - 6:43 AM PT
"Col." House was granted a colonelcy in the Texas militia in return for political services rendered.
Colossus:
I'll continue to cross swords with you on the inevitability of an Allied victory. IMO Germany's allies were ready to collapse by the end of 1917. The Italian victory at Vittorio Veneto in September 1918 would not have had any geographical effect on the war, but, had the war continued, the Allies could have recalled all of their units from the Italian Front to bolster the West. The Salonika front (previously known as the world's largest POW camp) broke open as the Allied forces there brushed aside collapsing Bulgarian resistance. Allenby's victories against the Ottoman Turks shattered them as a threat.
These victories were largely unaffected by the American entry into the war, and would have freed up large numbers of battle-hardened soldiers, either for service on the Western Front, or more intriguingly, in the Balkans, which would have threatened Romania directly. Of all the successful British generals, Allenby was alone in using highly mobile tactics, combining air power, cavalry, and armored cars to infiltrate and destroy an already demoralized enemy. One wonders what he might have done if turned loose on the Danube plain.
It is ironic that the propanda abuses of WWI made it more difficult for people to believe reports of what the Germans were doing in WWII.
150. pellenilsson - June 21, 1999 - 9:00 AM PT
Wombat
Please do me a favour and indicate which of colossus's post you argue against.
151. colossus - June 21, 1999 - 2:27 PM PT
Pelle -
You are correct. The Turkic failure of the Brits was a self-made disaster beginning with the ham handed pursuit of those 2 German cruisers, then on to Palestine, Iraq, Lawrence of Arabia.
All part of Churchill's unceasing fascination with the underbelly of Europe. More trouble than it was worth IMO. And the Balfour Declaration(!) don't get me started.
Still in all, the Brits were looking for another front because they understood what should have been obvious to all - that the Western front was a stalemate, a nightmare of cannon fodder and blood and death. I think this was implicit in the British arm twisting of the French to open a Balkan front thru Gallipoli.
They should have, unfortunately, made explicit what was clearly implicit - this war is a waste, let's give up Alsace and give Germany Indochina.
152. colossus - June 21, 1999 - 2:28 PM PT
and Austria gets Serbia and Germany gets Poland and the Baltic States.
No WWII. No Joe Stalin.
Sweden might be a great power today!
Deutschland Uber Alles!
153. colossus - June 21, 1999 - 2:30 PM PT
Message #136
Sounds like the Civil War for sure AU. In fact, wasn't it you who pointed out that the Civil War not the Franco Prussian war should have been the model for Europe's military experts to have followed?
154. colossus - June 21, 1999 - 2:38 PM PT
Sorry Wombat....your premise that the Turks were a factor in WWI renders your scenario useless.
There can be no question that
(a) the Ludendorff offensives were undertaken to beat the americans to the punch;
(b) the Ludendorff offensives prevented the digestion of Rumanian and Ukrainian resources
(c) the collapse of AH was due to the blockade and the awful waste of manpower against the Ruskies who were out of the war
(d) that the collapse of the Ludendorff offensives - the horrendous German losses- plus the arrival of American soldiers made the 1918 allied offensives possible
In the end you cannot say that the arrival of 1,000,000 plus fresh and well fed American troops did not turn the tide.
That was why Germany undertook the Ludendorff Offensives and that is why the Germans surrendered.
To maintain your thesis you must rely on teritiary theatres of operation and you must deny facts that decision makers on all sides saw as decisive at the time.
Crossing swords on this one is a tall order indeed. Never let it be said tha I I ever fail to the easy side of any argument.
:)
155. colossus - June 21, 1999 - 2:43 PM PT
Wombat:
Of events supporting your Turks as Key Thesis - Keegan devotes all of page 417.
156. ranheim - June 21, 1999 - 3:09 PM PT
With all of the combatants losing one generation of men, recovery following the war was very tough; eventually impacted by the world-wide depression. Had there been a typical European, negotiated peace, it would have been interesting to see where the wealthy american business man chose to invest his Liberty Bond money. Its all hypothetical. But, have a feeling that the USA business man would have chosen mainly UK and France. Kuhn-Loeb would have helped AH and Germany. Would anyone taken up the problems of Russia. Why? Too remote. Turkey and Italy would have continued to suffer. I imagine it would have been a VERY unstable situation. I would like to think that situation would have been better than what we KNOW occurred. But, Lenin was already in power; to be followed by Stalin. And who is to say that Hitler would not have prospered in the chaos that followed a negotiated end to WW I?
I, frankly, don't care terribly much. Europe would have settled their own problems without much help from the USA.
The portion of WW I that bothers me most is the international outlook that took over the elites (money and intelligentsia), the presidency, and much of congress. Teddy had involved the USA in a small way with the Spanish-American War. As it happened, WW I completed that job. After November, 1918 the USA was involved totally in European - thus world-wide - politics. One can look back with 20/20 vision now. I don't like the "cop of the world" job the USA has seemingly assumed.
I continue to believe that Washington was correct : No entangling alliances. And that Jefferson was correct : the government that governs least, governs best.
157. harper - June 21, 1999 - 3:31 PM PT
A couple of WWI factoids:
Mustard gas was considered the ultimate weapon, something so horrible that you didn't even want to think about it. Hitler was gassed during WWI & spent time in hospital recuperating from its effects. I wonder if he got so crazy because of its effects?
The Germans supplied munitions to the Irish rebels in order to destabilize the Brits. Maybe if they had to fight with those pesky Celts again, they'd go away and leave the Germans to kick butt on the rest of the Allies.
Were there any competent military leaders anywhere? It seems that none of them could lead a charge in a department store. Anyone who orders ANZAC troops to charge UP a cliff under direct Turkish fire (Suva Bay) has got to be an idiot. I'm not sure I agree that Petain was a good general, but I suppose he was the best around. God knows the Brits had the same old farts who had trouble beating a bunch of Boers and the Mahdi.
158. colossus - June 21, 1999 - 4:57 PM PT
"Were there any competent military leaders anywhere?"
Brusilov
Petain
Ludendorff
were passable. The rest were German Lieutenants learning their craft.
159. colossus - June 21, 1999 - 5:01 PM PT
A most neglected period - Germany immediately following the Armistice.
I don't understand the Spartacist Revolt and the increasing power of the Social Democrats during the War.
The sudden collapse of Germany while their troops were still on foreign soil is added evidence that the victory had more to do with the American threat and the related failure of the Germans during the Ludendorff offensive.
160. colossus - June 21, 1999 - 5:04 PM PT
Message #140
Message #146
Don't believe the lying Svede Rustler, Pelle was spreading his anti-Semitic Svedish venom again.
Get his ass! :)
161. colossus - June 21, 1999 - 5:08 PM PT
Ranheim,
If Mencken said it, I believe it.
The US was largely ignorant of socialism, communism, even imperialism.
All the US knew in 1917 about international matters was hardly more than it knew in 1812...Europe is screwed up and their wars are f*cking with our ability to profit and trade.
162. colossus - June 21, 1999 - 5:12 PM PT
AU -
Perhaps it was you who put WWI strategy and planning well or perhaps it was some other scholar I have read but to paraphrase:
"Joffre & Schliffen would have done better had they paid attention to Coldwater and not Sedan"
163. colossus - June 21, 1999 - 5:15 PM PT
Pelle:
Enlighten us. What did your people do in the Great War? What contribution did they make?
My Swedish horizon is limited to war profiteering and scheming with Bolsheviks and other miscreants.
Surely I am missing something.
:)
164. ranheim - June 21, 1999 - 8:17 PM PT
Thee is a 1998 book : Desperate Deception : British Covert Operations in the USA, 1939 - 1944. The book describes the extremely widespread network of William S. Stephenson (better know as Intrepid). The USA did not - promtly - enter WW II either. Many of the same reasons remained despite the Anglophile East Coast and other elite.
I don't believe a similar organization existed at the time of WW I. But Britain could not have chosen a better man to be their ambassador at that important time. Cecil Spring-Rice was first posted to the USA as a 3rd Secy in 1886. By 1913 he had worked himself up in Britain's diplomatic corps and he was appointed ambassador. Spring-Rice had a immense circle of friends and acquaintances among the east coast elite. Money, culture, politics, you name it, Spring-Rice had friends in all. And he was very influential; particularly behind the scenes. To my knowlege, Spring-Rice operated only overtly.
The man in the shadows was William Wiseman, Head of British Intelligence in the USA at the time. Having articles planted in the USA's english language newspapers was his task. He, too, attempted to discredit the large German speaking press. He had almost unlimited access to Col. House; which meant Wilson.
With these two extremely effective men + the money power headed by the House of Morgan, at times I am amazed at how long the pacifists and isolationists were able to keep the USA out of the war.
165. cmboyce - June 21, 1999 - 9:30 PM PT
Message #162
Colossus, what was Coldwater?
166. pellenilsson - June 22, 1999 - 3:59 AM PT
colossus - Message #163
"Pelle:
Enlighten us. What did your people do in the Great War?
What contribution did they make?
My Swedish horizon is limited to war profiteering and
scheming with Bolsheviks and other miscreants."
Yes, that's about it I guess. A couple of things that have ended up in footnotes.
At the request of Germany we allowed Lenin to transit Sweden on his way to St Petersburg. The myth is that the journey took place in "a sealed railway carriage" but it seems there was some wining and dining in Stockholm.
Germany's diplomatic traffic to the Americas transited in Stockholm and the Swedes had broken the code. This was where the Zimmerman telegram was picked up and then leaked to the US in devious ways to hide the origin. Tuchman has written a pleasant book on the subject.
Otherwise no heroic deeds or grand schemes that I'm aware of. Frankly, I'm not well read on Sweden and WWI. Sweden was firmly within the German cultural sphere and thus generally sympathetic to the German side. To pre-empt the otherwise inevitable riposte I write the word here:
Pathetic
167. Wombat - June 22, 1999 - 7:09 AM PT
The Franco-Prussian War was the European application of the lessons learned from the US Civil War. Some of the lessons were learned better than others. The Prussian use of railroads to concentrate their forces was masterful, the French leadership was unable to do the same.
Time and again, the Germans hurled masses of troops into showers of rifle fire (the French Chassepot rifle was vastly superior to the Dreyse "needle gun") and suffered terrible casualties. The French, who were slow to entrench, suffered heavy casualties from Prussian breech-loading artillery. Throughout the war, Prussian artillery was able to suppress French artillery and then break up any French infantry or cavalry formations within range. Until Sedan, French and Prussian casualties were about equal.
Militarily, the key to Prussian victory was that they were far more experienced in the handling of corps-sized formations, and had the military structure that enabled the army commander to control them over the breadth of the battlefield. French corps commanders operated independently (and often incompetently).
The political effects of the Franco-Prussian War (Alsace-Lorraine) were the gasoline that was in search of a match to light it. Better they should have let the French keep the provinces and tripled the indemnity.
168. pellenilsson - June 22, 1999 - 7:20 AM PT
Wombat
Regarding Alsace-Lorraine I have a vague recollection that Bismarck wanted to do exactly what you suggest. Realpoliker par eminence, he had no desire to leave a festering wound in Franco-German relations.
I may be wrong and if your opinion is different I'll go to what literature I have.
169. Wombat - June 22, 1999 - 7:25 AM PT
Jester:
You are obviously not reading my posts carefully. Turkey was a peripheral foe that tied up a lot of British troops. Since when do I say Turkey was the "key" to anything? Turkey's collapse would have freed up British troops for service elsewhere.
It is interesting that you place such value on the arrival of the Americans as the only factor behind the Ludendorff offensives and profess ignorance about the level of subversion that was occurring in Germany at the time. Ludendorff had to break the stalemate quickly and successfully as much to head off a revolution in Germany as to beat the Americans to Europe. A decisive victory may have staved off the revolution that came a few months later.
170. Wombat - June 22, 1999 - 7:57 AM PT
Other competent leaders:
Brits:
Allenby
Plumer
Maude
USA:
McArthur
Mitchell
Germany:
Hoffman
Hutier
Falkenheyn (after Verdun)
Turkey:
Kemal (later Ataturk)
171. jroth2 - June 22, 1999 - 8:24 AM PT
Wombat writes;
"Militarily, the key to Prussian victory was that they were far more experienced in the handling of corps-sized formations, and had the military structure that enabled the army commander to control them over the breadth of the battlefield. French corps commanders operated independently (and often incompetently)."
True enough in 1870. The irony is that the roles were reversed in 1914. The great criticism is that Moltke the Younger failed to maintain control of the Western Armies, especially the 1st (Von Kluck) and 2nd (Von Bulow). The effect was a dilution of the strategic thrust and the creation of a breathing space within which Joffre could reorganise.
Joffre, in comparison, maintained sang-froid and tight operational control- arguably saving the entire situation in the West. His wholesale sacking of Army, Corps and Divisional generals was precisely what was needed to ensure central control at the time of crisis. Von Moltke, in contrast, allowed his Army commanders too much leeway.
172. vonKreedon - June 22, 1999 - 8:27 AM PT
CMBoyce - Coldwater was a battle in which Grant sent infantry accross mostly open ground at entrenched Confederate infantry. The result, like Fredricksburg and Pickett's Charge at Gettysburg, was the slaughter of the attacking infantry to no effect.
173. Wombat - June 22, 1999 - 8:30 AM PT
Cold Harbor
174. jroth2 - June 22, 1999 - 8:39 AM PT
The proliferation of secondary and tertiary fronts was certainly in part a function of the frustration of the Allies. It was also, however, the traditional war policy of the British to use sea power to mount peripheral attacks on a Continental enemy. The policy had worked quite well against Napolean, and the British would attempt to resurrect the strategy again in WWII over strenuous American (and Russian) objections.
Still, it is difficult to see what decisive advantage could have been gained if all the Alllied resources had been concentrated along the Western Front. In my reading I fail to find any Allied campaign whose victory would have been insured by the presence of a few more divisions. The problem was simply that the Germans had defensive fortification in depth and a strong tradition of strategic defense and counterattack- a tradition which 25 years later allowed them to postpone defeat on the Eastern Front.
One of the more interesting arguments Keegan makes is that all the great offensives in the West were doomed by inadequate command and control- a failure of technology and organization. One of the few armies which took note was the American; despite interwar reductions the American army entered WWII with excellent artillery coordination and a multiple-layered communication system that linked units as small as squads and platoons.
175. jroth2 - June 22, 1999 - 8:45 AM PT
Ranheim,
Thank you for your many posts on the domestic politics of America's entry. I now have a better idea of the various pressures on Wilson for and against entry. I still lack, however, a sense of Wilson's own vision. Perhaps mistakenly I see him as a person of strong personal beliefs. If so, what was his vision for America's role following the war? Is it possible that he was motivated by an idealistic vision of Democracy?
176. Wombat - June 22, 1999 - 9:48 AM PT
JRoth:
Wilson did have an idealistic vision (much laughed at by his more cynical allies).
Your point on trench warfare is good and is valid. Given the German fortifications, a massive breakthrough was unlikely, and the huge battles of attrition were too costly. The ultimate Allied strategy in the West, that of limited sector-by-sector attacks along the length of the front, using the Allies' superior materiel and manpower, drove the Germans back slowly, maximizing their losses and minimizing the Allies'.
177. jroth2 - June 22, 1999 - 10:12 AM PT
Wombat,
I agree in large part. It seems that Ludendorf had a limited period of time in which to employ the divisions transferred from the East against the Allies before they were strengthened by the American infusion. Hence the ferocity of the final German offensives.
But the reality, as you point out, was that the nature of the War in the West prevented any 'knockout blow' by either side. The success of the limited offensives by the Allies seems to have been recognition of that fact- as well as an acceptance of war-weariness amongst their own ranks and populations.
Perhaps the metaphor provided by Colossus remains the most apt; exhausted heavyweights worn down by attrition. Certain wars and battles are studied for their value in teaching what to do in roughly analagous circumstances. The 1st World War provides military historians with examples of what NOT to do.
178. colossus - June 22, 1999 - 11:02 AM PT
Cold Harbor - sorry
Wombat -
WRT your Anglo-francophile delusions:
A group of bad ass, battle hardened (100 years war) French Knights were off to do battle with the Duke of Hapsburg circa 1371 when the Duke crossed the Rhine, the knights were reported to say:
"If we were to cross the Rhine, we could never return before we were dead or captured by our enemies the Germans, who are men without pity"
179. colossus - June 22, 1999 - 11:07 AM PT
Pelle:
I found some insight on the Danish-Swede socialist and war-profiteering in a rare tome about Alexander Israel Helphand (Parvus) who, with Trotsky, led the 1905 Soviet in Petersburg and financed the Social Dems and made millions as a German citizen and war profiteer and socialist.
180. colossus - June 22, 1999 - 11:18 AM PT
How many Brits would have been freed by victory in Palestine and Iraq Wombat?
And I don't profess ignorance about the social collapse of Germany just murkiness. Fact remains that Ludendorff's offensives were not undertaken to relieve domestic problems. In fact they exacerbated them because domestic problems were caused by blockade-caused shortages. Germany thus wasted resources in France and failed to exploit their recent windfall of food and fuel from Russia, resources that were untouchable.
This from Keegan says better than I what the arrival of the Americans meant:
"Throughout the following months (after 6/17), fresh units of an army planned to reach a strength of 80 divisions - nearly 3,000,000 men...continued to arrive. By March 1918, 318,000 men had reached France, the vanguard of 1,300,000 to be deployed by August....
Rarely are the times in a great war where the fortunes of one side or the other are transformed by the sudden accretion of a disequilibrating reinforcement....By 1918, President Wilson's decision to declare war...brought such an accretion to the Allied side. [German Admiral] Capelle's "they will never come" (1/31/17) had been trumped in 6 months by America's "Lafayette we are here".
That was why Germany lost the war Wombat.
181. colossus - June 22, 1999 - 11:26 AM PT
Jroth:
The single biggest problem after the Americans that the Germans faced was the British Blockade. With the Brest-litovsk treaty and the occupation of the Ukraine, the Blockade was ended. If memory serves, BL Treaty freed nearly 1,000,000 battle hardened troops to fight in the West, plus those sent to help the Austrians in Italy.
Their defensive position, as you will be reminded when you get that far in Keegan, was virtually unassailable. They occupied most of France's mineral areas.
Though Keegan makes no mention of it, AJP Taylor discusses at length the horrendous problems, both manpower and materiel, that the ground war and U-boat war was causing Britain. In his view, Britain was on the verge of collapse.
Keegan is so wildly pro-Brit, he probably ignores it for that reason, plus he take swipes at Taylor from time to time. I don't think he likes him for some reason.
182. colossus - June 22, 1999 - 11:29 AM PT
Wombat: "Falkenheyn (after Verdun)" - after Verdun he was fired and sent to fight Rumanians.
Hoffman was a colonel though indeed he has a fair claim as the Staff mastermind of Tannenberg. I only count generals.
I forgot von Mackensen and Foch.
183. colossus - June 22, 1999 - 11:39 AM PT
Out of respect for Wombat's Anglophilia:
"I went into a public-'ouse to get a pint o' beer,
The publican 'e up an' sez, "We serve no red-coats here."
The girls be'ind the bar they laughed an' giggled fit to die,
I outs into the street again an' to myself sez I:
O it's Tommy this, an' Tommy that, an' "Tommy, go away";
But it's "Thank you, Mister Atkins", when the band begins to play,
The band begins to play, my boys, the band begins to play,
O it's "Thank you, Mister Atkins", when the band begins to play.
I went into a theatre as sober as could be,
They gave a drunk civilian room, but 'adn't none for me;
They sent me to the gallery or round the music-'alls,
But when it comes to fightin', Lord! they'll shove me in the stalls!
For it's Tommy this, an' Tommy that, an' "Tommy, wait outside";
But it's "Special train for Atkins" when the trooper's on the tide,
The troopship's on the tide, my boys, the troopship's on the tide,
O it's "Special train for Atkins" when the trooper's on the tide.
Yes, makin' mock o' uniforms that guard you while you sleep
Is cheaper than them uniforms, an' they're starvation cheap;
An' hustlin' drunken soldiers when they're goin' large a bit
Is five times better business than paradin' in full kit.
Then it's Tommy this, an' Tommy that, an' "Tommy, 'ow's yer soul?"
But it's "Thin red line of 'eroes" when the drums begin to roll,
The drums begin to roll, my boys, the drums begin to roll,
O it's "Thin red line of 'eroes" when the drums begin to roll.
184. colossus - June 22, 1999 - 11:40 AM PT
We aren't no thin red 'eroes, nor we aren't no blackguards too,
But single men in barricks, most remarkable like you;
An' if sometimes our conduck isn't all your fancy paints,
Why, single men in barricks don't grow into plaster saints;
While it's Tommy this, an' Tommy that, an' "Tommy, fall be'ind",
But it's "Please to walk in front, sir", when there's trouble in the wind,
There's trouble in the wind, my boys, there's trouble in the wind,
O it's "Please to walk in front, sir", when there's trouble in the wind.
You talk o' better food for us, an' schools, an' fires, an' all:
We'll wait for extry rations if you treat us rational.
Don't mess about the cook-room slops, but prove it to our face
The Widow's Uniform is not the soldier-man's disgrace.
For it's Tommy this, an' Tommy that, an' "Chuck him out, the brute!"
But it's "Saviour of 'is country" when the guns begin to shoot;
An' it's Tommy this, an' Tommy that, an' anything you please;
An' Tommy ain't a bloomin' fool -- you bet that Tommy sees!
185. Wombat - June 22, 1999 - 12:50 PM PT
Colossus:
Who do you think commanded the German forces in the East by the time Brest Litovsk rolled around? (General Max Hoffmann)
Von Mackensen doesn't meet your Falkenheyn standard.
The U-boat threat receded as soon the British adopted the convoy. Had they done it sooner, the threat would have been that much less. As a historian, AJP Taylor was a controversialist, and is not taken particularly seriously.
If the Germans were getting so much food from the Ukraine, why did they have a famine in 1918-1919?
186. lazygeorge - June 22, 1999 - 1:06 PM PT
Additional Competent Commanders
Von Lettow-Vorbeck, Defended German East Africa.
Bruchmuller, Orchestrated the German Artillery's Fire Waltz of 1918.
Boelke, invented aerial fighter tactics
187. Wombat - June 22, 1999 - 1:34 PM PT
OK, let's list some of the most incompetent commanders and why.
188. colossus - June 22, 1999 - 1:52 PM PT
I also forgot Gen von Francois
189. colossus - June 22, 1999 - 2:02 PM PT
"If the Germans were getting so much food from the Ukraine, why did they have a famine in 1918-1919?"
My point exactly. They could not exploit their Brest Litovsk gains - be they manpower or materiel because they undertook the Ludendorff offensives of 1918 in the EXPLICIT recognition that 3,000,000 Americans were on the way.
I say if the Germans had the luxury of sitting behind the in depth defenses you admit were so awesome Message #176, the Germans could have taken Belgium and the mineral sections of France by default.
The effects of the blockade would lessen and no # of troops from Palestine or Iraq would have been able to do anything about it.
190. colossus - June 22, 1999 - 2:13 PM PT
The Best of the Worst:
Joffre - nothwithstanding Keegan's admiration for his toughness, he pressed Plan 17; ate 2 hour lunches; was a pig; fired commanders on a whim and failed to see the great wheeling movement until too late.
Haig - Bloody fool
French - nervous nellie
Falkenhayn - "race to the sea"; Verdun
Tsar Nicholas II
Prittwitz - almost lost Prussia
Rennenkampf - could have won Tanneberg
vonMoltke - lack of command and control over the Wheel
Lanzerac - Great until Joffre's idiocy drove him to a nervous breakdown
Gough -
191. colossus - June 22, 1999 - 2:16 PM PT
More bloody bastards and murderers:
Conrad von Hotzendorff - threw away the cream of the Austrian army in egregious strategic errors
Cadorna - an Italian Haig - a butcher and an ass
192. colossus - June 22, 1999 - 2:20 PM PT
Also competent:
Gens Elles, Byng and Tudor - developed tank tactics
193. Wombat - June 22, 1999 - 2:27 PM PT
I like general Stopford, who commanded the division that landed at Suvla Bay at Gallipoli. The beach was deserted, there was no resistance, in fact the Turkish lines had been completely outflanked. As the troops relaxed on the beach, Stopford did nothing. Mustapha Kemal, then a Colonel, was informed of the British landing, and rushed whatever troops he could find to Suvla Bay. When the Britsh finally got around to moving inland, Kemal's ragtag and outnumbered units halted them.
194. ranheim - June 22, 1999 - 3:59 PM PT
jroth2 (#175)
My personal opinion of Wilson is that he was an egomaniac. The federal government structure was not as vast nor as complicated then as is the case currently. Wilson had a secretary; and that was about it! He ran all over the advice of his cabinet should the difference, in his opinion, be significant. At one point in time in 1917 he remarked to his secretary - my paraphrase - I know nothing about making war and my place in history will go down as a wartime president. He was not happy with that. He wanted to be known for his domestic politics. Sound familar?
Don't feel too sorry for him. The Punitive Exhibition against Mexico (read Pancho Villa) was a significant military action. The military historians will know better than I; but, I don't recall a declaration of war. This was Wilson at work.
Was Wilson an idealist? To some extent. One can't read his 14 points without feeling this. But, that was his last hurrah. He was said to have the "flu" while in Paris. Most of the medical writing that I have seen believes that he had a "small stroke" (TIA to be medically correct) or worse; not the flu. Then he tried to single handidly "convert" the country to put pressure on the Senate so as to pass the League of Nations. Thus, the tremendously brutal railroad trip across the nation. The severe stroke was sustained in the west on this trip and he was paralysed and could not speak afterwards. It was said that his 2nd wife ran the country from his sickroom. He knew, upon his return from Europe, that the Senate was not going to approve the treaty (is that correct?) that the Senate would have to pass for the USA to join the League of Nations.
There is no way to now know anything about plans that he may have had for domestic politics in the USA at the end of the war.
195. lazygeorge - June 22, 1999 - 4:34 PM PT
I vote for Nivelle as most incompetent. His leadership resulted in "collective indiscipline".
196. jroth2 - June 22, 1999 - 5:04 PM PT
For most incompetent I nominate the entire Russian Stavka and field commanders with the exception of Brusilov. At the top of the list is Nicholas II who took personal command and was thus held personally responsible. There is something truly revulsive about the Russian attitude toward casualties- in both World Wars.
Not to quibble, but it is unclear that the qualities Allenby exhibited in the peripheral theaters would have worked on the Western Front.
The Italian commander, Cadona (sp?), was also a butcher and idiot.
I have special animus toward Haig, the very epitome of the political general who is profligate with the lives of his soldiers.
Perhaps one could argue that the American method of war-making changed after WWI, even by WWII the general consensus was to substitute machines for men. If you follow this line of thought, the recent performance of the American military in Kuwait and Yugoslavia represents the culmination of this thinking.
197. Wombat - June 23, 1999 - 7:20 AM PT
JRoth:
Allenby exhibited no particular qualities as an Army commander in 1916-17. His troops seized Vimy Ridge at the beginning of the Paschendaele offensive, but quickly bogged down. He was very much the pour-em-in type on the Western Front. It wasn't until he was given command of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, in a theater of operations that allowed his cavalry background to come to the fore, that he blossomed. He also exhibited sufficient open-mindedness to actually use T.E. Lawrence and his irregulars effectively.
I would say that Austro-Hungarian commanders and staff win the prize for most incompetent. Even the Russians beat them regularly and badly.
198. Ronski - June 23, 1999 - 7:47 AM PT
Wilson suffered from the academic's conceit that he, being smarter and more educated than most people, knew how the world should be run (run, that is, by smart, educated people, largely telling other people what to do). Afflicted so, Wilson overreached.
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My late partner's biological grandfather was killed at Gallipoli. I still have a photograph of him in his British uniform: a particularly handsome, dashing fellow.
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I would be interested if anyone can post on the short-lived socialist and Marxist republics and city-states that popped up briefly at the close of and immediately following the war (Bavaria, Bohemia, and a few others, I believe).
199. jroth2 - June 23, 1999 - 8:14 AM PT
Allenby's performance on the Western Front confirms my expectations.
The A/H generals were bad, certainly, but at least they weren't as criminally negligent as many of the Russian commanders who sent unarmed men into the trenches with instructions to follow the first wave and equip themselves with the rifles of those killed. The whole Russian system was rotten and corrupt; the A/H system was just incompetent.
In general, all of the forces displayed a cavalier attitude toward the lives of common soldiers that is incomprehensible to a Western military professional today. Perhaps the persistent and bloody stalemate was only made possible by the industrial revolution; previous armies, when locked in place, hadn't the resource base to continue.
200. jroth2 - June 23, 1999 - 8:21 AM PT
Ronski,
Are you asking about the abortive revolutions? Certainly there was enough socialist/communist sentiment prior to the war, but in most cases the 'international' socialists rapidly became nationalists. Still, as the history of Rosa Luxemburg evidences, the activists survived and took advantage of the precipitous decline in state authority following the Armstice. The center no longer held.